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Abstract
The importance of collateralization through the change of funding cost is now well
recognized among practitioners. In this article, we have extended the previous studies
of collateralized derivative pricing to more generic situation, that is asymmetric and
imperfect collateralization with the associated counter party credit risk. By introduc-
ing the collateral coverage ratio, our framework can handle these issues in an unified
manner. Although the resultant pricing formula becomes non-linear FBSDE and can-
not be solve exactly, the fist order approximation is provided using Gateaux derivative.
We have shown that it allows us to decompose the price of generic contract into three
parts: market benchmark, bilateral credit value adjustment (CVA), and the collat-
eral cost adjustment (CCA) independent from the credit risk. We have studied each
term closely, and demonstrated the significant impact of asymmetric collateralization
through CCA using the numerical examples.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, collateralization has experienced dramatic increase in the derivative
market. According to the ISDA survey [13], the percentage of trade volume subject to
collateral agreements in the OTC (over-the-counter) market has now become 70%, which
was merely 30% in 2003. If we focus on large broker-dealers and the fixed income market,
the coverage goes up even higher to 84%. Stringent collateral management is also a crucial
issue for successful installation of CCP (central clearing parties).
Despite its long history in the financial market as well as its critical role in the risk
management, it is only after the explosion of Libor-OIS spread following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers that the effects of collateralization on derivative pricing have started to
gather strong attention among practitioners. In most of the existing literatures, collat-
eral cost has been neglected, and only its reduction of counterparty exposure have been
considered. The work of Johannes & Sundaresan (2007) [14] was the first focusing on the
cost of collateral, which studied its effects on swap rates based on empirical analysis. As
a more recent work, Piterbarg (2010) [18] discussed the general option pricing using the
similar formula to take the collateral cost into account.
In a series of works of Fujii, Shimada & Takahashi (2009) [8, 9] and Fujii & Takahashi
(2010,2011) [10, 11], modeling of interest rate term structures under collateralization has
been studied, where cash collateral is assumed to be posted continuously and hence the
remaining counterparty credit risk is negligibly small. In these works, it was found that
there exists a direct link between the cost of collateral and CCS (cross currency swap)
spreads. In fact, one cannot neglect the cost of collateral to make the whole system
consistent with CCS markets, or equivalently with FX forwards. Making use of this
relation, we have also shown the significance of a ”cheapest-to-deliver” (CTD) option
implicitly embedded in a collateral agreement in Fujii & Takahashi (2011) [11].
In this paper, we have extended the existing works to handle asymmetric as well as
imperfect collateralization in the unified credit-risk modeling framework. Asymmetric
collateralization arises when CSA (credit support annex) treats the two contracting par-
ties asymmetrically, such as different collateral thresholds and unilateral collateralization.
Even if the adopted CSA is symmetric, asymmetric collateralization may arise due to the
different level of sophistication in collateral management of the two parties. For example,
even if CSA allows the same set of eligible currencies for the both parties, if one of them
does not have appropriate system or easy access to the relevant foreign currencies, it can-
not fully exercise the allowed optionality of choosing the cheapest currency to post. We
have shown interesting numerical examples using OIS (overnight index swap) and CCS.
By introducing the collateral coverage ratio, our pricing framework allows to include
under- as well as over-collateralization where there remains counter party credit risk. In
general, we see the pricing formula becomes non-linear FBSDEs since the amount of col-
lateral and also the counter-party exposure depend on the value of portfolio at every time
in the future, which itself is affected by the collateral cost and default payoff in turn. We
have adopted Gateaux derivative to obtain the first order approximation, as in the work of
Duffie & Huang (1996) [4], and found that it is possible to decompose the price of portfolio
into the following parts:
(1) Clean price representing the value under the perfect and symmetric collateralization.
(2) Bilateral CVA (or CVA/DVA).
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(3) CCA (collateral cost adjustment) representing the change of collateral cost due to the
deviation from the perfect symmetric collateralization but independent from credit risk.
We will see that the clean price under the perfect and symmetric collateralization has
the desirable features as the market benchmark. It retains the additivity and hence one
can evaluate each trade (and cash flow) separately. In fact, we see that the clean price
formula is consistent with those obtained in our previous works [8, 11], which is becoming
the market standard as the OIS discounting. In other words, our pricing method allows
one to decompose the value of a generic contract into the market benchmark and the
remaining corrections which are credit risk and collateral cost.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Sec. 2, we discuss the generic formula-
tion. The first order approximation using Gateaux derivative is explained in Sec. 3. Secs. 4
and 5 are devoted to explain the case of perfect collateralization and Sec. 6 provides numer-
ical examples to demonstrate the effects of asymmetric collateralization. Sec. 7 discusses
the implications for the behavior of financial firms induced by these effects. Sec. 8 treats
the imperfect collateralization and CVA, which shows the importance of the interplay be-
tween the collateral funding cost and other variables. We finally conclude in Sec. 9. The
following Appendix contains technical details and proofs omitted in the main text.
2 Generic Formulation
In this section, we consider the generic pricing formula. As an extension from the previous
works, we allow asymmetric and/or imperfect collateralization with bilateral default risk.
We basically follow the setup in Duffie & Huang (1996) [4] and extend it so that we can
deal with existence of collateral and its cost explicitly. The approximate pricing formulas
that allow simple analytic treatment are derived by Gateaux derivatives. See other related
developments in, for examples, [1, 3, 16, 2, 17] and references therein.
2.1 Fundamental Pricing Formula
2.1.1 Setup
We consider a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F, Q), where F = {Ft : t ≥ 0} is sub-σ-
algebra of F satisfying the usual conditions. Here, Q is the spot martingale measure, where
the money market account is being used as the numeraire. We consider two counterparties,
which are denoted by party 1 and party 2. We model the stochastic default time of party i
(i ∈ {1, 2}) as an F-stopping time τ i ∈ [0,∞], which are assumed to be totally inaccessible.
We introduce, for each i, the default indicator function, H it = 1{τ i≤t}, a stochastic process
that is equal to one if party i has defaulted, and zero otherwise. The default time of
any financial contract between the two parties is defined as τ = τ1 ∧ τ2, the minimum
of τ1 and τ2. The corresponding default indicator function of the contract is denoted by
Ht = 1{τ≤t}. The Doob-Meyer theorem implies the existence of the unique decomposition
as H i = Ai+M i, where Ai is a predictable and right-continuous (it is continuous indeed,
since we assume total inaccessibility of default time), increasing process with Ai0 = 0,
and M i is a Q-martingale. In the following, we also assume the absolute continuity of Ai
and the existence of progressively measurable non-negative process hi, usually called the
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hazard rate of counterparty i, such that
Ait =
∫ t
0
his1{τ i>s}ds, t ≥ 0 . (2.1)
For simplicity we also assume that there is no simultaneous default with positive proba-
bility and hence the hazard rate for Ht is given by ht = h
1
t + h
2
t on the set of {τ > t}.
2.1.2 Collateralization
We assume collateralization by cash which works in the following way: if the party i (∈
{1, 2}) has negative mark-to-market, it has to post cash collateral 1 to the counter party
j (6= i), where the coverage ratio of the exposure is denoted by δit ∈ R+. We assume the
margin call and settlement occur instantly. Party j is then a collateral receiver and has to
pay collateral rate cit on the posted amount of collateral, which is δ
i
t×(|mark-to-market|), to
the party i. This is done continuously until the end of the contract. A common practice in
the market is to set cit as the time-t value of overnight (ON) rate of the collateral currency
used by the party i.
We emphasize that it is crucially important to distinguish the ON rate ci from the
theoretical risk-free rate of the same currency ri, where both of them are progressively
measurable. The distinction is necessarily for the unified treatment of different collaterals
and for the consistency with cross currency basis spreads, or equivalently FX forwards in
the market (See, Sec. 5.4 and Ref. [11] for details.).
We consider the assumption of continuous collateralization is a reasonable proxy of the
current market where daily (even intra-day) margin call is becoming popular. Although we
assume continuous collateralization, we include the under- as well as over-collateralization
in which we have δit < 1 and δ
i
t > 1, respectively. It may look slightly odd at first sight to
include δit 6= 1 cases under the continuous assumption, we think that allowing it makes the
model more realistic considering the possible price dispute between the relevant parties,
which is particularly the case for exotic derivatives. Because of the model uncertainty,
the price reconciliation is usually done in ad-hoc way, say taking an average of each
party’s quote. As a result, even after the each margin settlement, there always remains
sizable discrepancy between the collateral value and the model implied fair value of the
portfolio. Furthermore, in order to prepare for the rapid change of the collateral value,
over-collateralization with sizable haircut is also frequently observed in the market.
Under these assumptions, the remaining credit exposure of the party i to the party j
at time t is given by
max(1− δjt , 0)max(V
i
t , 0) + max(δ
i
t − 1, 0)max(−V
i
t , 0) ,
where V it denotes the mark-to-market value of the contract from the view point of party
i. The second term corresponds to the over-collateralization, where the party i can only
recover the fraction of overly posted collateral when party j defaults. We denote the
1According to the ISDA survey [13], more than 80% of collateral being used is cash. If there is a liquid
repo or security-lending market, we may also carry out similar formulation with proper adjustments of its
funding cost.
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recovery rate of the party j, when it defaults at time t, by the progressively measurable
process Rjt ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the recovery value that the party i receives can be written as
Rjt
(
max(1− δjt , 0)max(V
i
t , 0) +max(δ
i
t − 1, 0)max(−V
i
t , 0)
)
. (2.2)
As for notations, we will use a bracket ”( )” when we specify type of currency, such as
r
(i)
t and c
(i)
t , the risk-free and the collateral rates of currency (i), in order to distinguish it
from that of counter party. We also denote a spot FX at time t by f
(i,j)
x (t) that is the price
of a unit amount of currency (j) in terms of currency (i). We assume all the technical
conditions for integrability are satisfied throughout this paper.
2.1.3 Pricing Formula
We consider the ex-dividend price at time t of a generic financial contract made between
the party 1 and 2, whose maturity is set as T (> t). We consider the valuation from the
view point of party 1, and define the cumulative dividend Dt that is the total receipt from
party 2 subtracted by the total payment from party 1. We denote the contract value as
St and define St = 0 for τ ≤ t. See Ref.[4] for the technical details about the regularity
conditions which guarantee the existence and uniqueness of St.
Under these assumptions and the setup give in Secs. 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, one obtains
St = βtE
Q
[∫
]t,T ]
β−1u 1{τ>u}
{
dDu +
(
y1uδ
1
u1{Su<0} + y
2
uδ
2
u1{Su≥0}
)
Sudu
}
+
∫
]t,T ]
β−1u 1{τ≥u}
(
Z1(u, Su−)dH
1
u + Z
2(u, Su−)dH
2
u
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (2.3)
on the set of {τ > t}. Here, yi = ri − ci denotes a spread between the risk-free and
collateral rates of the currency used by party i, which represents the instantaneous return
from the collateral being posted, i.e. it earns ri but subtracted by ci as the payment to the
collateral payer. Here, we have used the risk-free rate as the effective investment return or
borrowing cost of cash after adjusting all the market and credit risks. βt = exp
(∫ t
0 rudu
)
is a money market account for the currency on which St is defined. Z
i is the recovery
payment from the view point of the party 1 at the time of default of party i (∈ {1, 2}):
Z1(t, v) =
(
1− (1−R1t )(1− δ
1
t )
+
)
v1{v<0} +
(
1 + (1−R1t )(δ
2
t − 1)
+
)
v1{v≥0} (2.4)
Z2(t, v) =
(
1− (1−R2t )(1− δ
2
t )
+
)
v1{v≥0} +
(
1 + (1−R2t )(δ
1
t − 1)
+
)
v1{v<0} , (2.5)
where X+ denotes max(X, 0). Note that the above definition is consistent with the setup
in Sec.2.1.2. The surviving party loses money if the received collateral from the defaulted
party is not enough or if the posted collateral to the defaulted party exceeds the fair
contract value.
Eq. (2.3) contains the indicator function H i within the expectation and is not useful for
valuation. Thus, as usually done in the credit modeling, we try to eliminate the indicators
from the expectation. Even in the presence of the collateral, it is in fact possible to prove
the following proposition in completely parallel fashion with the one given in [4]:
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Proposition 1 Suppose a generic financial contract between the party 1 and 2, of which
cumulative dividend at time t is denoted by Dt from the view point of the party 1. Assume
that the contract is continuously collateralized by cash where the coverage ratio of the
party i (∈ {1, 2})’s exposure is denoted by δit ∈ R+. The collateral receiver j has to pay
the collateral rate denoted by cit on the amount of collateral posted by party i, which is not
necessarily equal to the risk-free rate of the same currency, rit. The fractional recovery
rate Rit ∈ [0, 1] is assumed for the under- as well as over-collateralized exposure. For the
both parties, totally inaccessible default is assumed, and the hazard rate process of party i
is denoted by hit. We assume there is no simultaneous default of the party 1 and 2, almost
surely.
Then, conditioned on no-default (τ > t), the contract value St given in Eq. (2.3) is
represented by the pre-default value Vt satisfying St = Vt1{τ>t}
Vt = E
Q
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(
ru − µ(u, Vu)
)
du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, t ≤ T (2.6)
where
µ(t, v) =
(
y1t δ
1
t − (1−R
1
t )(1− δ
1
t )
+h1t + (1−R
2
t )(δ
1
t − 1)
+h2t
)
1{v<0}
+
(
y2t δ
2
t − (1−R
2
t )(1− δ
2
t )
+h2t + (1−R
1
t )(δ
2
t − 1)
+h1t
)
1{v≥0} (2.7)
if the jump of V at the time of default (= τ) is zero almost surely.
See Appendix A for the proof.
Naively speaking, by focusing on the pre-default world (τ > t), we have replaced all
the indicator functions in (2.3) with the corresponding intensities (or hazard rates), which
then leads to the expression of V in (2.6) by straightforward integration. However, pre-
cisely speaking, we have to check if the two quantities St and Vt1{τ>t} actually follow the
equivalent SDEs up to the default time. This point is actually confirmed in the proof.
Note that the no-jump condition ∆Vτ = 0 is not crucial. Since we are only interested
in pre-default value, we can replace the hazard rates as those conditioned on no-default,
which then easily recovers ∆Vτ = 0. See the remark in Appendix A for the details.
3 Decomposing the Pre-default Value
From Proposition 1, one sees the effective discounting rate becomes non-linear due to the
correction term µ(t, v):
µ(t, v) = y˜1t 1{v<0} + y˜
2
t 1{v≥0} (3.1)
where
y˜it = δ
i
ty
i
t − (1−R
i
t)(1 − δ
i
t)
+hit + (1−R
j
t )(δ
i
t − 1)
+hjt (3.2)
for i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i. As one can see, due to the presence of the dependence on v through
the indicator, the pricing formula of Eq. (2.6) together with other market variables form a
system of non-linear FBSDE. Since it is impossible to solve in general, we need to consider
some approximation procedures.
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3.1 Perfect and Symmetric Collateralization
Since non-linearity appears only through the indicators, we can recover the linearity if
y˜1s = y˜
2
s Lebesgue-a.e. s ∈ [t, T ] a.s. (3.3)
This situation naturally arises when the collateralization is perfect and symmetric, or
(δ1 = δ2 = 1) and (y1 = y2 = y). In fact, in this case, the pricing formula (2.6) becomes
V t = E
Q
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(
ru − yu
)
du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (3.4)
Note that we have recovered the additivity here: The portfolio value can be obtained
by adding that of each trade, which is calculable separately. This is the most important
feature as the market benchmark since otherwise a trade price depends on the whole
portfolio to the specific counter party and there would be no price transparency. As we
will see shortly, this actually corresponds to the collateral rate discounting [8, 18], which
is becoming the market standard [15].
3.2 Generic Situations
Now, let us consider more generic situations where the collateralization is imperfect (δi 6=
1) and/or asymmetric (y1 6= y2). In order to evaluate Eq. (2.6) approximately, we consider
expanding V around the previously obtained V in the first order of Taylor expansion.
It means that we try to express the contract value by the market benchmark and the
remaining corrections.
Firstly, let us express the correction to the discounting rate µ(t, v) around the collateral
cost at the benchmark point y:
µ(t, v) = yt +∆y˜
1
t 1{v<0} +∆y˜
2
t 1{v≥0} (3.5)
where
∆y˜it = y˜
i
t − yt
=
{
(δity
i
t − yt)− (1−R
i
t)(1− δ
i
t)
+hit + (1−R
j
t )(δ
i
t − 1)
+hjt
}
(3.6)
for i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i. The first order effect of ∆y˜ is given by Gateaux derivative ∇V ,
which is a sort of gradient by considering V as a functional of y˜:
lim
ǫ↓0
sup
t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∇V (y, y˜)−
Vt
(
y + ǫ
(
∆y˜1t 1{v<0} +∆y˜
2
t 1{v≥0}
))
− Vt(y)
ǫ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (3.7)
Notice that Vt(y) is actually V t in Eq. (3.4). Following the method explained in Duffie &
Skiadas (1994) [6] and Duffie & Huang (1996) [4] , we can derive
∇V (y, y˜) = EQ
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(ru−yu)duV s
(
∆y˜1s1{V s<0} +∆y˜
2
s1{V s≥0}
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (3.8)
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Substituting the contents of ∆y˜ into (3.8), the above Gateaux derivative can be further
decomposed into two parts, one of which is the collateral cost adjustment independent from
the credit risk
CCAt = E
Q
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(ru−yu)du
(
−(δ1sy
1
s − ys)
[
−V s
]+
+ (δ2sy
2
s − ys)
[
V s
]+)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(3.9)
and the other is the well-known bilateral CVA terms
CVAt = E
Q
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(ru−yu)duh1s(1−R
1
s)
{
(1− δ1s)
+
[
−V s]
+ + (δ2s − 1)
+
[
V s
]+}
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− EQ
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(ru−yu)duh2s(1−R
2
s)
{
(1− δ2s)
+
[
V s
]+
+ (δ1s − 1)
+
[
−V s
]+}
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
(3.10)
Using these terms, the original pre-default value of Eq. (2.6) can be approximated in the
first order of ∆y˜ as 2
Vt = V t +CCAt +CVAt + o(∆y˜
1,∆y˜2) . (3.11)
In the following sections, we will study each term more closely. We basically treat the
perfect collateralization (δ1 = δ2 = 0) until Sec. 8, where we will study CVA.
4 Perfect Collateralization
In the following section, we first deal with the perfectly collateralized situation where
CVA = 0. We check the several important examples, which will also be used to price some
fundamental instruments used in numeral examples in the next section.
4.1 Symmetric Collateralization
Let us first consider the market benchmark, or the perfect and symmetric collateraliza-
tion. In this case we have δ1 = δ2 = 1 and y1 = y2 = y, and hence CCA = CVA = 0.
One can easily confirm that all the following results are consistent with those given in
Refs. [8, 9, 11, 10].
Case 1: Situation where both parties use the same collateral currency ”(i)”, which is
the same as the deal currency. Since we have y = y(i) = r(i) − c(i) in this case, the
pre-default value of the contract in terms of currency (i) is given by
Vt = E
Q(i)
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
c(i)u du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (4.1)
where Q(i) is the spot-martingale measure of currency (i). In this case, we can use the
collateral rate to discount the future cash flows as if it is the usual risk-free rate. Since
2 Recently, we have developed the methodology to carry out higher order approximation for non-linear
FBSDEs [12].
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the collateral rate of cash is the corresponding ON rate, this formula corresponds to the
OIS discounting method, which is becoming the new standard in the market 3.
Case 2: Situation where both parties use the same collateral currency ”(k)”, which is
the different from the deal currency ”(i)”. In this case, y = y(k) and the pre-default value
of the contract in terms of currency (i) is given by
Vt = E
Q(i)
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(
c(i)u + y
(i,k)
u
)
du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (4.2)
where we have defined the funding spread between the currencies (i) and (k):
y(i,k)u = y
(i)
u − y
(k)
u (4.3)
=
(
r(i)u − c
(i)
u
)
−
(
r(k)u − c
(k)
u
)
. (4.4)
This formula is particularly important for non-G5 currencies and multi-currency trades
where it is quite common to use USD as the collateral currency (k). There, the funding
spread reflects the funding cost of USD relative to the deal currency (i), which is reflected
in the corresponding cross currency basis swap. This point will be explained in Sec. 5.4
in details.
Case 3: Situation where the deal currency is (i) and the both parties have a common set
of eligible collateral currencies denoted by C. Note that only the collateral payer at each
time has the right to choose the collateral to post. In this case, y = mink∈C y
(k) and then
we have
Vt = E
Q(i)
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(
c(i)u +max
k∈C
y(i,k)u
)
du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(4.5)
as the pre-default value of the contract in terms of currency (i).
Notice that the collateral payer will choose the currency (k) that minimizes the cost of
collateral (mink∈C y
(k)), which is equivalent to maximizing the effective discounting rate
so that the payer achieves the smallest mark-to-market loss. The optionality is crucially
depends on the volatility of CCS and can be numerically quite significant. See Ref. [11]
for details.
4.2 Asymmetric Collateralization
We now consider the situation where CVA = 0 but there remains non-zero CCA due to
the asymmetric collateralization y1 6= y2.
Suppose the situation where the trade is perfectly collateralized (δ1 = δ2 = 1) and the
party 1 can choose the optimal currency from the eligible set denoted by C or (y1 =
mink∈C y
(k)), whereas the party 2 can only use the single currency (j) as collateral (y2 =
y(j)). Assume the deal currency is (i). If we choose the center of expansion as y = y(j) (=
y2) and then we have
CCAt = E
Q(i)
[∫ T
t
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(
c(i)u + y
(i,j)
u
)
du
)[
−V s]
+max
k∈C
y(j,k)s
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (4.6)
3See the recent survey done by KPMG [15].
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where
V t = E
Q(i)
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(
c(i)u + y
(i,j)
u
)
du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (4.7)
Since only the party 1 has the cheapest-to-deliver optionality, the CCA adds the positive
value to the contract 4. This value should be reflected in the contract price otherwise the
party 2 will suffer a loss by giving a free option to the party 1.
Although we have assumed the asymmetric collateral agreement in the above example,
similar situation can naturally arise even if the relevant CSA itself is symmetric. For
example, even if the party 2 has the same eligible collateral set, if it lacks the easy access
to the currencies involved, then it ends up with the same situation. One can see that
it is very dangerous to make a flexible collateral agreement if there is no ability to fully
exercise its embedded optionality, especially when the counter party is more sophisticated
in collateral management. We will give interesting numerical studies for the above example
in Sec. 6.
Another important example of asymmetric collateralization is the one-way CSA where
collateralization is performed only unilaterally. This is actually common when sovereigns
or central banks are involved as counter parties. The detailed explanation of this situation
is given in Sec. 8 with default risk taken into account.
5 Some Fundamental Instruments
In order to study the quantitative effects of collateralization, we firstly need to understand
the clean price, i.e., V . The details of generic term structure modeling under perfect
collateralization are available in Refs [8, 9, 11]. In this section, we just summarize some
of the fundamental instruments required to understand the following numerical examples
which demonstrates the impact of asymmetric collateralization.
5.1 Collateralized Zero Coupon Bond
We define the collateralized zero coupon bond of currency (i) as
D(i)(t, T ) = EQ
(i)
[
e−
∫ T
t
c
(i)
s ds1
∣∣∣Ft] . (5.1)
We call it ”Bond” by analogy with conventional interest rate models but it simply repre-
sents the present value of the perfectly collateralized contract that has the unit payment of
cash in the future time T (See, Eq. (4.1).). As you can see in [11] for example, this plays
the role as the discounting factor for the collateralized cash flow. This fact can be easily
understood by noticing that there is additivity in price for the perfect and symmetric
collateralization 5.
In the same way, for the case where the deal and collateral currencies are different, (i)
and (j) respectively, we define the foreign collateralized zero coupon bond D(i,j) by
D(i,j)(t, T ) = EQ
(i)
[
e−
∫ T
t
c
(i)
s ds
(
e−
∫ T
t
y
(i,j)
s ds
)
1
∣∣∣Ft] . (5.2)
4Remember that we are calculating the contract value from the view point of the party 1.
5There is no point to issue collateralized zero coupon bond to raise cash from the market since the
issuer has to post the same amount of cash as collateral to the buyer.
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In particular, if c(i) and y(i,j) are independent, we have
D(i,j)(t, T ) = D(i)(t, T )e−
∫ T
t
y(i,j)(t,s)ds , (5.3)
where
y(i,j)(t, s) = −
∂
∂s
lnEQ
(i)
[
e−
∫ s
t
y
(i,j)
u du
∣∣∣Ft] (5.4)
denotes the forward y(i,j) spread. As before one needs to understand this instrument as
the present value of unit payment collateralized by a foreign currency.
5.2 Collateralized FX Forward
Because of the existence of collateral, FX forward transaction now becomes non-trivial.
The precise understanding of the collateralized FX forward is crucial to deal with generic
collateralized products. The definition of currency-(k) collateralized FX forward contract
for the currency pair (i, j) is as follows 6:
• At the time of trade inception t, both parties agree to exchange K unit of currency
(i) with the one unit of currency (j) at the maturity T . Throughout the contract period,
the continuous collateralization by currency (k) is performed, i.e. the party who has neg-
ative mark-to-market needs to post the equivalent amount of cash in currency (k) to the
counter party as collateral, and this adjustment is made continuously. The FX forward
rate f
(i,j)
x (t, T ; k) is defined as the value of K that makes the value of the above contract
zero at the time of its inception.
By using the results of Sec. 4.1, K needs to satisfy the following relation:
KEQ
(i)
[
e
−
∫ T
t
(
c
(i)
s +y
(i,k)
s
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− f (i,j)x (t)E
Q(j)
[
e
−
∫ T
t
(
c
(j)
s +y
(j,k)
s
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= 0 (5.5)
and hence the FX forward is given by
f (i,j)x (t, T ; k) = f
(i,j)
x (t)
EQ
(j)
[
e
−
∫ T
t
(
c
(j)
s +y
(j,k)
s
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
EQ
(i)
[
e
−
∫ T
t
(
c
(i)
s +y
(i,k)
s
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
] (5.6)
= f (i,j)x (t)
D(j,k)(t, T )
D(i,k)(t, T )
, (5.7)
which becomes a martingale when D(i,k)(·, T ) is used as the numeraire. In particular, we
have
EQ
(i)
[
e−
∫ T
t
(
c
(i)
s +y
(i,k)
s
)
dsf (i,j)x (T )
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= D(i,k)(t, T )ET
(i,k)
[
f (i,j)x (T, T ; k)
∣∣∣Ft]
= D(i,k)(t, T )f (i,j)x (t, T ; k) . (5.8)
6In the market, USD is popular as the collateral for multi-currency trades.
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Here, we have defined the (k)-collateralized (i) forward measure T (i,k), where D(i,k)(·, T )
is used as the numeraire. ET
(i,k)
[·] denotes expectation under this measure.
Remark: In the case of FX futures, the trade is continuously settled and hence the gain or
loss is immediately realized. Since the realized gain or loss is not considered as collateral,
there is no exchange of collateral rate c between the financial firm and security exchange.
Therefore, unless we set c = 0, the collateralized FX forward value is different from that
of futures.
5.3 Overnight Index Swap
The overnight index swap (OIS) is a fixed-vs-floating swap which is the same as the usual
IRS except that the floating leg pays periodically, say quarterly, compounded ON rate
instead of Libors. Let us consider T0-start TN -maturing OIS of currency (j) with fixed
rate SN , where T0 ≥ t. If the party 1 takes a receiver position, we have
dDs =
N∑
n=1
δTn(s)
[
∆nSN + 1− exp
(∫ Tn
Tn−1
c(j)u du
)]
(5.9)
where ∆ is day-count fraction of the fixed leg, and δT (·) denotes Dirac delta function at
T . In particular, if OIS is collateralized by its domestic currency (j), its value Vt is given
by
Vt =
N∑
n=1
∆nD
(j)(t, Tn)SN −
(
D(j)(t, T0)−D
(j)(t, TN )
)
, (5.10)
and hence the par rate is expressed as
SN =
D(j)(t, T0)−D
(j)(t, TN )∑N
n=1∆nD
(j)(t, Tn)
. (5.11)
5.4 Cross Currency Swap
Cross currency swap (CCS) is one of the most fundamental products in FX market. Espe-
cially, for maturities longer than a few years, CCS is much more liquid than FX forward
contract and is the dominant funding source of foreign currencies. The current market
is dominated by USD crosses where 3m USD Libor flat is exchanged by 3m Libor of a
different currency with additional (negative in many cases) basis spread. The most popu-
lar type of CCS is called MtMCCS (Mark-to-Market CCS) in which the notional of USD
leg is refreshed at the every Libor fixing time, while the notional of the other leg is kept
constant throughout the contract. For model calibration, MtMCCS should be used as we
have done in Ref. [11] considering its liquidity. However, in this paper, we study another
type of CCS, which is actually tradable in the market, to make the link between y and
CCS much clearer.
We study the Mark-to-Market cross currency overnight index swap (MtMCCOIS),
which is exactly the same as the usual MtMCCS except that it pays a compounded ON
rate, instead of the Libor, of each currency periodically. Let us consider (i, j)-MtMCCOIS
where currency (i) intended to be USD and needs notional refreshments, and currency (j)
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is the one in which the basis spread is to be paid. Let us suppose the party 1 is the spread
receiver and consider T0-start TN -maturing (i, j)-MtMCCOIS. For the (j)-leg, we have
dD(j)s = −δT0(s) + δTN (s) +
N∑
n=1
δTn(s)
[(
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(j)
u du
− 1
)
+ δnBN
]
, (5.12)
where BN is the basis spread of the contract. For (i)-leg, in terms of currency (i), we have
dD(i)s =
N∑
n=1
[
δTn−1(s)f
(i,j)
x (Tn−1)− δTn(s)f
(i,j)
x (Tn−1)e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(i)
u du
]
. (5.13)
In total, in terms of currency (j), we have
dDs = dD
(j)
s + f
(j,i)
x (s)dD
(i)
s (5.14)
= dD(j)s +
N∑
n=1
[
δTn−1(s)− δTn(s)
f
(j,i)
x (Tn)
f
(j,i)
x (Tn−1)
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(i)
u du
]
(5.15)
=
N∑
n=1
δTn(s)
[
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(j)
u du
+ δnBN −
f
(j,i)
x (Tn)
f
(j,i)
x (Tn−1)
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(i)
u du
]
. (5.16)
If the collateralization is done by currency (k), then the value for the party 1 is given
by
Vt =
N∑
n=1
EQ
(j)
[
e−
∫ Tn
t
(c
(j)
u +y
(j,k)
u )du
{
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(j)
u du
+ δnBN −
f
(j,i)
x (Tn)
f
(j,i)
x (Tn−1)
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(i)
u du
}∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
(5.17)
where T0 ≥ t. In particular, if the swap is collateralized by currency (i) (or USD) that is
popular in the market, we obtain
Vt =
N∑
n=1
δnBND
(j)(t, Tn)e
−
∫ Tn
t
y(j,i)(t,u)du
−
N∑
n=1
D(j)(t, Tn−1)e
−
∫ Tn−1
t y
(j,i)(t,u)du
(
1− e
−
∫ Tn
Tn−1
y(j,i)(t,u)du
)
=
N∑
n=1
[
δnBND
(j,i)(t, Tn)−D
(j,i)(t, Tn−1)
(
1− e
−
∫ Tn
Tn−1
y(j,i)(t,u)du
)]
. (5.18)
Here, we have assumed the independence of c(j) and y(j,i). In fact, the assumption seems
reasonable according to the recent historical data studied in Ref. [11]. In this case, we
obtain the par MtMCCOIS basis spread as
BN =
∑N
n=1D
(j,i)(t, Tn−1)
(
1− e
−
∫ Tn
Tn−1
y(j,i)(t,u)du
)
∑N
n=1 δnD
(j,i)(t, Tn)
. (5.19)
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Thus, it is easy to see that
BN ∼
1
TN − T0
∫ TN
T0
y(j,i)(t, u)du, (5.20)
which gives us the relation between the currency funding spread y(j,i) and the observed
cross currency basis. Therefore, the cost of collateral y is directly linked to the dynamics
of CCS markets. It is interesting to understand the origin of the funding spread y(i,k) in
the pricing formula (4.2) based on the above discussion of CCS. Interested readers can
read Appendix B for the details.
6 Numerical Studies for Asymmetric Collateralization
In this section, we study the effects of perfect but asymmetric collateralization and hence
(CVA = 0, CCA 6= 0), using the two fundamental products, MtMCCOIS and OIS. The
results will clearly tell us that the sophistication of collateral management does matter in
the real business. For both cases, we use the following dynamics in Monte Carlo simulation:
dc
(j)
t =
(
θ(j)(t)− κ(j)c
(j)
t
)
dt+ σ(j)c dW
1
t (6.1)
dc
(i)
t =
(
θ(i)(t)− ρ2,4σ
(i)
c σ
(j,i)
x − κ
(i)c
(i)
t
)
dt+ σ(i)c dW
2
t (6.2)
dy
(j,i)
t =
(
θ(j,i)(t)− κ(j,i)y
(j,i)
t
)
dt+ σ(j,i)y dW
3
t (6.3)
d ln f (j,i)x (t) =
(
c
(j)
t − c
(i)
t + y
(j,i)
t −
1
2
(σ(j,i)x )
2
)
dt+ σ(j,i)x dW
4
t (6.4)
where {W i, i = 1 · · · 4} are Brownian motions under the spot martingale measure of cur-
rency (j). Every θ(t) is a deterministic function of time, and is adjusted in such a way
that we can recover the initial term structures of the relevant variable. The procedures for
the curve construction are given in Appendix C. We assume every κ and σ are constants.
We allow general correlation structure (d[W i,W j]t = ρi,jdt) except that ρ3,j = 0 for all
j 6= 3.
The above dynamics is chosen just for simplicity and demonstrative purpose, and
generic HJM framework can also be applied to the evaluation of Gateaux derivative. For
details of generic dynamics in HJM framework, see Refs. [9, 10]. In the following, we use
the term structure for the (i, j) pair taken from the typical data of (USD, JPY) in early
2010 for presentation. In Appendix H, we have provided the term structures and other
parameters used in simulation.
6.1 Asymmetric Collateralization for MtMCCOIS
We now implement Gateaux derivative using Monte Carlo simulation based on the model
we have just explained. To see the accuracy of Gateaux derivative, we have compared it
with a numerical result directly obtained from PDE using a simplified setup in Appendix G.
Firstly, we consider MtMCCOIS explained in Sec. 5.4. We consider a spot-start, TN -
maturing (i, j)-MtMCCOIS, where the leg of currency (i) (intended to be USD) needs
14
Figure 1: Price difference from symmetric limit for 10y MtMCCOIS
Figure 2: Price difference from symmetric limit for 20y MtMCCOIS
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notional refreshments. Let us assume perfect but asymmetric collateralization as follows:
(1) Party 1 can use either the currency (i) or (j) as collateral.
(2) Party 2 can only use the currency (i) as collateral.
For the derivation of the present value, see Appendix D.1.
In Figs. 1 and 2, we have shown the numerical result of CCA which is the price
difference from the symmetric limit, for 10y and 20y MtMCCOIS, respectively. The spread
B was chosen in such way that the value in symmetric limit, V 0, becomes zero. In both
cases, the horizontal axis is the annualized volatility of y(j,i), and the vertical one is the
price difference from CCA in terms of bps of notional of currency (j). When the party 1
is the spread payer (receiver), we have used the left (right) axis. The results are rather
insensitive to the FX volatility due to the notional refreshments of currency-(i) leg. From
the historical analysis performed in Ref. [11], we know that annualized volatility of y(j,i)
tends to be 50bps or so in a calm market, but it can be (100 ∼ 200)bps or more in a volatile
market for major currency pairs, such as (EUR,USD) and (USD, JPY). Therefore, the
impact of asymmetric collateralization in this example can be practically very significant
when party 1 is the spread payer. When the party 1 is the spread receiver, one sees that
the impact of asymmetry is very small, only a few bps of notional. This can be easily
understood in the following way: When the party 1 has a negative mark-to-market and
hence is the collateral payer who has the option to change the collateral currency, y(j,i)
tends to be large and hence the optimal currency remains the same currency (i).
Finally, let us briefly mention about the standard MtMCCS with Libor payments. As
discussed in Ref. [11], the contribution from Libor-OIS spread to CCS is not significant rel-
ative to that of y(j,i). Therefore, the numerical significance of asymmetric collateralization
is expected to be quite similar in the standard case, too.
6.2 Asymmetric Collateralization for OIS
Now we study the impact of asymmetric collateralization on OIS. We consider OIS of
currency (j), and assume the following asymmetry in collateralization:
(1) Party 1 can use either the currency (i) or (j) as collateral.
(2) Party 2 can only use the currency (j) (domestic currency) as collateral.
For the derivation of the present value, see Appendix D.2.
In Figs. 3, 4, and 5, we have shown the numerical results of CCA for 10y and 20y
OIS from the view point of party 1. In the first two figures, we have fixed σ
(j)
c = 1%
and changed σ
(j,i)
y to see the sensitivity against CCS. In the last figure, we have fixed the
y(j,i) volatility as σ
(j,i)
y = 0.75% and changed the volatility of collateral rate c(j). Since
the term structure of OIS used in simulation is upward sloping, the mark-to-market value
of the fixed receiver tends to be negative in the long end of the contract. This makes
the cheapest-to-deliver optionality bigger for the receiver, and hence it has bigger CCA
contribution than the case of payer.
7 General Implications of Asymmetric Collateralization
From the results of section 6, we have seen the practical significance of asymmetric collat-
eralization. It is now clear that sophisticated financial firms may obtain significant funding
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Figure 3: Price difference from symmetric limit for 10y OIS
Figure 4: Price difference from symmetric limit for 20y OIS
Figure 5: Price difference from symmetric limit for 20y OIS for the change of σ
(j)
c
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benefit from the less-sophisticated counter parties.
Before going to discuss the imperfect collateralization and associated CVA, let us ex-
plain two generic implications of asymmetric collateralization, one for netting and the
other for resolution of information, which is closely related to the observation just ex-
plained. Although derivation itself can be done in exactly the same way as Ref. [4] after
the reinterpretation of several variables, we get new insights for collateralization that may
be important for the appropriate design and regulations for the financial market.
7.1 An implication for Netting
Proposition 2 7 Assume perfect collateralization. Suppose that, for each party i, yit
is bounded and does not depend on the contract value directly. Let V a, V b, and V ab
be, respectively, the value processes (from the view point of party 1) of contracts with
cumulative dividend processes Da, Db, and Da + Db (i.e., netted portfolio). If y1 ≥ y2,
then V ab ≥ V a + V b, and if y1 ≤ y2, then V ab ≤ V a + V b.
Proof is available in Appendix E. The interpretation of the proposition is very clear:
The party who has the higher funding cost y due to asymmetric CSA or lack of sophistica-
tion in collateral management prefer to have netting agreements to decrease funding cost.
On the other hand, an advanced financial firm who has capability to carry out optimal
collateral strategy to achieve the lowest possible value of y tries to avoid netting to exploit
funding benefit. For example, an advanced firm may prefer to enter an opposite trade
with a different counterparty rather than to unwind the original trade. For standardized
products traded through CCPs, such a firm may prefer to use several clearing houses
cleverly to avoid netting.
The above finding seems slightly worrisome for the healthy development of CCPs. Ad-
vanced financial firms that have sophisticated financial technology and operational system
are usually primary members of CCPs, and some of them are trying to set up their own
clearing service facility. If those firms try to exploit funding benefit, they avoid concentra-
tion of their contracts to major CCPs and may create very disperse interconnected trade
networks and may reduce overall netting opportunity in the market. Although remaining
credit exposure is very small as long as collateral is successfully being managed, the dis-
persed use of CCPs may worsen the systemic risk once it fails. In the work of Duffie &
Huang [4], the corresponding proposition is derived in the context of bilateral CVA. We
emphasize that one important practical difference is the strength of incentives provided
to financial firms. Although it is somewhat obscure how to realize profit/loss reflected in
CVA, it is rather straightforward in the case of collateralization by making use of CCS
market as we have explained in Sec. 5.4.
7.2 An implication for Resolution of Information
We once again follow the setup given in Ref [4]. We assume the existence of two markets:
One is market F , which has filtration F, that is the one we have been studying. The other
one is market G with filtration G = {Gt : t ∈ [0, T ]}. The market G is identical to the
7We assume perfect collateralization just for clearer interpretation. The results will not change quali-
tatively as long as δiyit > (1−R
i
t)(1− δ
i
t)
+hit − (1−R
j
t )(δ
i
t − 1)
+h
j
t .
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market F except that it has earlier resolution of uncertainty, or in other words, Ft ⊆ Gt
for all t ∈ [0, T ] while F0 = G0. The spot marting measure Q is assumed to apply to the
both markets.
Proposition 3 8 Assume perfect collateralization. Suppose that, for each party i, yi is
bounded and does not depend on the contract value directly. Suppose that r, y1 and y2 are
adapted to both the filtrations F and G. The contract has cumulative dividend process D,
which is a semimartingale of integrable variation with respect to filtrations F and G. Let
V F and V G denote, respectively, the values of the contract in markets F and G from the
view point of party 1. If y1 ≥ y2, then V F0 ≥ V
G
0 , and if y
1 ≤ y2, then V F0 ≤ V
G
0 .
Proof is available in Appendix F. The proposition implies that the party who has the
higher effective funding cost y either from the lack of sophisticated collateral management
technique or from asymmetric CSA would like to delay the information resolution to avoid
timely margin call from the counterparty. The opposite is true for advanced financial firms
which are likely to have advantageous CSA and/or sophisticated system. The incentives
to obtain funding benefit will urge these firms to provide mark-to-market information
of contracts to counter parties in timely manner, and seek early resolution of valuation
dispute to achieve funding benefit. Considering the privileged status of these firms, the
latter effects will probably be dominant in the market.
8 Imperfect Collateralization and CVA
As we have explained in Sec. 3.2, our framework can also handle the imperfectly collat-
eralized contract, where there remain counter party credit risk as well as collateral cost
adjustment. In the remainder of this paper, we study several important examples of im-
perfect collateralization by using the generic results of Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10).
Case 1: Consider the situation where the both parties use collateral currency (i), which
is the same as the deal currency. In this case, CCA and CVA are given by
CCAt = E
Q(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u duy(i)s
(
−(δ1s − 1)
[
−V s
]+
+ (δ2s − 1)
[
V s
]+)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(8.1)
and
CVAt = E
Q
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u duh1s(1−R
1
s)
{
(1− δ1s )
+
[
−V s]
+ + (δ2s − 1)
+
[
V s
]+}
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− EQ
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u duh2s(1−R
2
s)
{
(1− δ2s )
+
[
V s
]+
+ (δ1s − 1)
+
[
−V s
]+}
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(8.2)
where
V t = E
Q(i)
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
c(i)u du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(8.3)
8We assume perfect collateralization just for clearer interpretation. The results will not change quali-
tatively as long as δiyit > (1−R
i
t)(1− δ
i
t)
+hit − (1−R
j
t )(δ
i
t − 1)
+h
j
t .
19
is a value under perfect collateralization by domestic currency. This would be the most
common situation in the market. Note that the discounting rate is given by the collateral
rate and there also exists CCA term.
Case 2: Consider the situation where the both parties have to use collateral currency
(j) which is different from the deal currency (i). In this case, CCA and CVA are given by
CCAt = E
Q(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(
c
(i)
u +y
(i,j)
u
)
duy(j)s
(
−(δ1s − 1)
[
−V s
]+
+ (δ2s − 1)
[
V s
]+)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(8.4)
and
CVAt = E
Q(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(
c
(i)
u +y
(i,j)
u
)
duh1s(1−R
1
s)
{
(1− δ1s )
+
[
−V s]
+ + (δ2s − 1)
+
[
V s
]+}
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− EQ
(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(
c
(i)
u +y
(i,j)
u
)
duh2s(1−R
2
s)
{
(1− δ2s )
+
[
V s
]+
+ (δ1s − 1)
+
[
−V s
]+}
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(8.5)
where
V t = E
Q(i)
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(
c(i)u + y
(i,j)
u
)
du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(8.6)
is a value under perfect collateralization by the foreign currency. This is also a common
situation for multi- or non-G5 currency trades collateralized by USD but with sizable
uncollateralized exposure due to price disputes, for example.
Note that the correlation between the currency funding spread y(i,j) and hazard rates
may contribute significantly to the value of CVA. This is easy to understand, for exam-
ple, by considering the USD collateralized EUR derivatives with an European bank as a
counter party. As clearly seen in the ongoing turmoil of Euro zone, expensive funding cost
of USD reflected by widening EUR/USD CCS basis spread seems highly correlated to the
deteriorating creditworthiness of European banks.
Case 3: Let us consider another important situation, which is the unilateral collater-
alization with bilateral default risk. Suppose the setup in Case 1 except that only the
party 1 has to post the collateral due to its low creditworthiness relative to the party 2.
In this case, we have
CCAt = −E
Q(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u duy(i)s
(
(δ1s − 1)
[
−V s
]+
+
[
V s
]+)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(8.7)
and
CVAt = E
Q(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u duh1s(1−R
1
s)
{
(1− δ1s )
+
[
−V s]
+
}
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− EQ
(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u duh2s(1−R
2
s)
{[
V s
]+
+ (δ1s − 1)
+
[
−V s
]+}
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(8.8)
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where V is the same as Eq. (8.3). If party 1 is required to post ”strong” currency (that
is the currency with high value of y(i), such as USD [11]), and also imposed stringent
collateral management δ1 ≃ 1, it may suffer significant funding cost from CCA even when
CVA is small enough due to the high credit worthiness of the party 2.
Note that, this example is particularly common when SSA (sovereign, supranational
and agency) is involved as party 2. For example, when it is a central bank, it does not
post collateral but receives it. For the party 1, it is very difficult to hedge this position.
Typically, the risk associated with the funding cost in CCA remains un-hedged, since
party 1 has to follow bilateral collateralization when it enters an offsetting trade in the
interbank market. Once the market interest rate starts to go up while the overnight rate c
is kept low by the central bank, the resultant mark-to-market loss from CCA can be quite
significant due to the rising cost of collateral ”y”.
Case 4: Our framework can also handle the trades with non-zero collateral thresholds,
where margin call occurs only when the exposure to the counter party exceeds the thresh-
old. A threshold is a level of exposure below which collateral will not be called, and
hence it represents the amount of uncollateralized exposure. If the exposure is above the
threshold, only the incremental exposure will be collateralized.
Usually, the collateral thresholds are set according to the credit standing of each
counter party. They are often asymmetric, with lower-rated counter party having a lower
threshold than the other. It may be adjusted during the contract according to the ”trig-
gers” linked to the credit ratings of the contracting parties. We assume that the threshold
of counter party i at time t is set by Γit > 0, and that the exceeding exposure is perfectly
collateralized continuously.
In the presence of thresholds, Eq. (2.3) is modified in the following way:
St = βtE
Q
[∫
]t,T ]
β−1u 1{τ>u} {dDu + q(u, Su)Sudu}
+
∫
]t,T ]
β−1u 1{τ≥u}
{
Z1(u, Su−)dH
1
u + Z
2(u, Su−)dH
2
u
}∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (8.9)
where
q(t, St) = y
1
t
(
1 +
Γ1t
St
)
1{St<−Γ1t }
+ y2t
(
1−
Γ2t
St
)
1{St≥Γ2t}
, (8.10)
and
Z1(t, St) = St
[(
1 + (1−R1t )
Γ1t
St
)
1{St<−Γ1t}
+R1t1{−Γ1t≤St<0} + 1{St≥0}
]
Z2(t, St) = St
[(
1− (1−R2t )
Γ2t
St
)
1{St≥Γ2t}
+R2t1{0≤St<Γ2t} + 1{St<0}
]
.
Here, we have assumed the same recovery rate for the uncollateralized exposure regardless
of whether the contract value is above or below the threshold.
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Following the same procedures given in Proposition 1, one can show that the pre-
default value of the contract Vt is given by
Vt = E
Q
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(
ru − µ(u, Vu)
)
du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, t ≤ T (8.11)
where
µ(t, Vt) = y
1
t 1{Vt<0} + y
2
t 1{Vt≥0}
−
(
y1t + h
1
t (1−R
1
t )
) [
1{−Γ1t≤Vt<0}
−
Γ1t
Vt
1{Vt<−Γ1t}
]
−
(
y2t + h
2
t (1−R
2
t )
) [
1{0≤Vt<Γ2t }
+
Γ2t
Vt
1{Vt≥Γ2t }
]
. (8.12)
Now, consider the case where the both parties use the same collateral currency (i),
which is equal to the deal currency. Then, we have
µ(t, Vt) = y
(i)
t −
{
y
(i)
t 1{−Γ1t≤Vt<Γ
2
t}
+y
(i)
t
[
Γ1t
Vt
1{Vt<−Γ1t}
−
Γ2t
Vt
1{Vt≥Γ2t }
]
−h1t (1−R
1
t )
[
1{−Γ1t≤Vt<0}
−
Γ1t
Vt
1{Vt<−Γ1t}
]
−h2t (1−R
2
t )
[
1{0≤Vt<Γ2t}
+
Γ2t
Vt
1{Vt≥Γ2t}
]}
. (8.13)
Thus, applying Gateaux derivative around the symmetric perfect collateralization with
currency (i) i.e. y = y(i), we obtain
Vt ≃ V t +CCA+ CVA, (8.14)
where
V t = E
Q(i)
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
c(i)u du
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (8.15)
and
CCAt = −E
Q(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u duy(i)s V s1{−Γ1s≤V s<Γ2s}ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+EQ
(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u duy(i)s
[
Γ1s1{V s<−Γ1s}
− Γ2s1{V s≥Γ2s}
]
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(8.16)
CVAt = −E
Q(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u du
[
h1s(1−R
1
s)
(
V s1{−Γ1s≤V s<0}
− Γ1s1{V s<−Γ1s}
)]
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
−EQ
(i)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(i)
u du
[
h2s(1−R
2
s)
(
V s1{0<V s≤Γ2s} + Γ
2
s1{V s>Γ2s}
)]
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
(8.17)
22
It is easy to see that the terms in CCA are reflecting the fact that no collateral is being
posted in the range {−Γ1t ≤ Vt ≤ Γ
2
t }, and that the posted amount of collateral is smaller
than |V | by the size of threshold. The terms in CVA represent bilateral uncollateralized
credit exposure, which is capped by each threshold.
Remarks: Although we have treated (δit) as the process of the collateral coverage ra-
tio, it is also useful to handle the collateral devaluation. It is plausible that the value of
collateral is highly linked to the counter party and its value may jump downward at the
time of default. For example, we can consider a USD interest rate swap collateralized by
EUR cash with an European bank as a counter party. It is easy to imagine that EUR/USD
jump downward at the time of default of the European bank. If we assume the bilateral
perfect collateralization, then CCA is zero, but there appears non-zero CVA which can be
calculated by interpreting δiτ as the fraction of devaluation of the collateral posted by party
i. We can introduce the collateral coverage ratio and the fraction of collateral devaluation
separately to handle more generic situations.
9 Conclusions
This article develops the methodology to deal with asymmetric and imperfect collateral-
ization as well as remaining counterparty credit risk. It was shown that all of the issues
are able to be handled in an unified way by making use of Gateaux derivative. We have
shown that the resulting formula contains CCA that represents adjustment of collateral
cost due to the deviation from the perfect collateralization, and the terms corresponding
to the bilateral CVA. The credit value adjustment now contains the possible dependency
among cost of collaterals, hazard rates, collateral coverage ratio and the underlying con-
tract value. Even if we assume that the collateral coverage ratio and recovery rate are
constant, the change of effective discounting rate induced by the currency funding spread
and its correlation to the hazard rates may significantly change the size of the adjustment.
Direct link of CCS spread and collateral cost allows us to study the numerical signif-
icance of asymmetric collateralization. From the numerical analysis using CCS and OIS,
the relevance of sophisticated collateral management is now clear. If a financial firm is
incapable of posting the cheapest collateral currency, it has to pay very expensive funding
cost to the counter party. We also explained the issue of one-way CSA, which is common
when SSA entities are involved. If the funding cost of collateral (or ”y”) rises, the financial
firm that is the counterparty of SSA may suffer from significant mark-to-market loss from
CCA, and it is quite difficult to hedge.
The article also discussed some generic implications of collateralization. In particular,
it was shown that the sophisticated financial firms have an incentive to avoid netting
of trades if they try to exploit funding benefit as much as possible, which may reduce
the overall netting opportunity and potentially increase the systemic risk in the financial
market.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Firstly, we consider the SDE for St. Let us define Lt = 1−Ht. One can show that
β−1t St +
∫
]0,t]
β−1u Lu
(
dDu + q(u, Su)Sudu
)
+
∫
]0,t]
β−1u Lu−
(
Z1(u, Su−)dH
1
u + Z
2(u, Su−)dH
2
u
)
= EQ
[∫
]0,T ]
β−1u 1{τ>u}
{
dDu +
(
y1uδ
1
u1{Su<0} + y
2
uδ
2
u1{Su≥0}
)
Sudu
}
+
∫
]0,T ]
β−1u Lu−
(
Z1(u, Su−)dH
1
u + Z
2(u, Su−)dH
2
u
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= mt (A.1)
where
q(t, v) = y1t δ
1
t 1{v<0} + y
2
t δ
2
t 1{v≥0} (A.2)
and {mt}t≥0 is a Q-martingale. Thus we obtain the following SDE:
dSt − rtStdt+ Lt
(
dDt + q(t, St)Stdt
)
+ Lt−
(
Z1(t, St−)dH
1
t + Z
2(t, St−)dH
2
t
)
= βtdmt .
(A.3)
Using the decomposition of H it , we get
dSt − rtStdt+ Lt
(
dDt + q(t, St)Stdt
)
+ Lt
(
Z1(t, St)h
1
t + Z
2(t, St)h
2
t
)
dt = dnt , (A.4)
where we have defined
dnt = βtdmt − Lt−
(
Z1(t, St−)dM
1
t + Z
2(t, St−)dM
2
t
)
(A.5)
and {nt}t≥0 is also a some Q-martingale. Using the fact that
q(t, St)St + Z
1(t, St)h
1
t + Z
2(t, St)h
2
t = St
(
µ(t, St) + ht
)
, (A.6)
one can show that the SDE for St is given by
dSt = −LtdDt + Lt
(
rt − µ(t, St)− ht
)
Stdt+ dnt . (A.7)
Secondly, let us consider the SDE for Vt. By following the similar procedures, one can
easily see that
e−
∫ t
0
(
ru−µ(u,Vu)
)
duVt +
∫
]0,t]
e−
∫ s
0
(
ru−µ(u,Vu)
)
dudDs
= EQ
[∫
]0,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
(
ru − µ(u, Vu)
)
du
)
dDu
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= m˜t , (A.8)
where {m˜t}t≥0 is a Q-martingale. Thus we have
dVt = −dDt +
(
rt − µ(t, Vt)
)
Vtdt+ dn˜t , (A.9)
where
dn˜t = e
∫ t
0
(
ru−µ(u,Vu)
)
dudm˜t , (A.10)
24
and hence {n˜t}t≥0 is also a Q-martingale. As a result we have
d(1{τ>t}Vt) = d(LtVt)
= Lt−dVt − Vt−dHt −∆Vτ∆Hτ
= −Lt−dDt + Lt
(
rt − µ(t, Vt)
)
Vtdt− LtVthtdt−∆Vτ∆Hτ
+Lt−
(
dn˜t − Vt−(dM
1
t + dM
2
t )
)
= −LtdDt + Lt
(
rt − µ(t, Vt)− ht
)
Vtdt−∆Vτ∆Hτ + dN˜t, (A.11)
where {N˜t}t≥0 is a Q-martingale such that
dN˜t = Lt−
(
dn˜t − Vt−(dM
1
t + dM
2
t )
)
. (A.12)
Therefore, by comparing Eqs. (A.7) and (A.11) and also the fact that ST = 1{τ>T}VT = 0,
we cannot distinguish 1{τ>t}Vt from St if there is no jump at the time of default ∆Vτ = 0. 
Remark: In this remark, we briefly discuss the assumption of ∆Vτ = 0. Notice that,
since we assume totally inaccessible default time, there is no contribution from pre-fixed
lump-sum coupon payments to the jump. In addition, it is natural (and also common in
the existing literatures) to assume global market variables, such as interest rates and FX’s,
are adapted to the background filtration independent from the defaults. In this paper,
we are concentrating on the standard fixed income derivatives without credit sensitive
dividends, and hence the only thing we need to care about is the behavior of hazard rates,
h1 and h2. Therefore, in this case, if there is no jump on hi on the default of the other
party j 6= i, then the assumption ∆Vτ = 0 holds true. This corresponds to the situation
where there is no default dependence between the two firms.
If there exists non-zero default dependence, which is important in risk-management
point of view, then there appears a jump on the hazard rate of the surviving firm when
a default occurs. This represents a direct feedback (or a contagious effect) from the
defaulted firm to the surviving one. In this case, if we directly use F-intensities hi, the
no-jump assumption does not hold.
However, even in this case, there is a way to handle the pricing problem correctly. Let
us construct the filtration in the usual way as Ft = Gt∨H
1
t∨H
2
t , where Gt is the background
filtration (say, generated by Brownian motions), and Hit is the filtration generated by H
i.
Since the only information we need is up to τ = τ1 ∧ τ2, we can limit our attention
to the intensities conditional on no-default, which are now the processes adapted to the
background filtration G = (Gt){t≥0}. Therefore, although the details of the derivation
slightly change, one can show that the pricing formula given in Eq. (2.6) can still be
applied in the same way once we use the G-intensities instead, since now we can write all
the processes involved in the formula adapted to the background filtration.
B Origin of the Funding Spread y(i,k) in the Pricing Formula
Here, let us comment about the origin of the funding spread y in our pricing formula in
Eq. (4.2). Consider the following hypothetical but plausible situation to get a clear image:
(1): An interest rate swap market where the participants are discounting future cash flows
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by domestic OIS rate, regardless of the collateral currency, and assume there is no price
dispute among them. (2): Party 1 enters two opposite trades with party 2 and 3, and they
are agree to have CSA which forces party 2 and 3 to always post a domestic currency U
as collateral, but party 1 is allowed to use a foreign currency E as well as U . (3): There
is very liquid CCOIS market which allows firms to enter arbitrary length of swap. The
spread y is negative for CCOIS between U and E, where U is a base currency (such as
USD in the above explanation).
In this example, the party 1 can definitely make money. Suppose, at a certain point,
the party 1 receives N unit amount of U from the party 2 as collateral. Party 1 enters a
CCOIS as spread payer, exchanging N unit amount of U and the corresponding amount
of E, by which it can finance the foreign currency E by the rate of (E’s OIS +y(E,U)).
Party 1 also receives U ’s OIS rate from the CCOIS counter party, which is going to be
paid as the collateral margin to the party 2. Party 1 also posts E to the party 3 since it
has opposite position, it receives E’s OIS rate as the collateral margin from the party 3.
As a result, the party 1 earns −y(E,U) (> 0) on the notional amount of collateral. It can
rollover the CCOIS, or unwind it if y’s sign flips.
Of course, in the real world, CCS can only be traded with certain terms which makes
the issue not so simple. However, considering significant size of CCS spread (a several tens
of bps) it still seems possible to arrange appropriate CCS contracts to achieve cheaper
funding. For a very short term, it may be easier to use FX forward contracts (or FX
swaps) for the same purpose. In order to prohibit this type of arbitrage, party 1 should
pay extra premium to make advantageous CSA contracts. This is exactly the reason why
our pricing formula contains the funding spread y.
C Calibration to swap markets
For the details of calibration procedures, the numerical results and recent historical behav-
ior of underlyings are available in Refs. [8, 11]. The procedures can be briefly summarized
as follows: (1) Calibrate the forward collateral rate c(i)(0, t) for each currency using OIS
market. (2) Calibrate the forward Libor curves by using the result of (1), IRS and tenor
swap markets. (3) Calibrate the forward y(i,j)(0, t) spread for each relevant currency pair
by using the results of (1),(2) and CCS markets.
Although we can directly obtains the set of y(i,j) from CCS, we cannot uniquely deter-
mine each y(i), which is necessary for the evaluation of Gateaux derivative when we deal
with unilateral collateralization and CCA (collateral cost adjustment). For these cases,
we need to make an assumption on the risk-free rate for one and only one currency. For
example, if we assume that ON rate and the risk-free rate of currency (j) are the same,
and hence y(j) = 0, then the forward curve of yUSD is fixed by yUSD(0, t) = −y(j,USD)(0, t).
Then using the result of yUSD, we obtains {y(k)} for all the other currencies by making
use of {y(k,USD)} obtained from CCS markets. More ideally, each financial firm may carry
out some analysis on the risk-free profit rate of cash pool or more advanced econometric
analysis on the risk-free rate, such as those given in Feldhu¨tter & Lando (2008) [7].
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D Details of Present Value Derivation in Sec. 6
D.1 Asymmetrically collateralized MtMCCOIS
In this case, the price of the contract at time 0 from the view point of party 1 is given by
V0 = E
Q(j)
[∫
]0,TN ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
R(u, Vu)du
)
dDs
]
(D.1)
where
R(t, Vt) = c
(j)
t + y
(j,i)
t +max
(
−y
(j,i)
t , 0
)
1{Vt<0} , (D.2)
and
dDs =
N∑
n=1
{
δTn(s)
[
−e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(j)
u du − δnB +
f
(j,i)
x (Tn)
f
(j,i)
x (Tn−1)
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(i)
u du
]}
. (D.3)
The expression of R can be easily checked by noticing that
y1 = min(y(i), y(j)) = y(i) +min(y(j,i), 0)
= y(i) −max(−y(j,i), 0) (D.4)
y2 = y(i) (D.5)
Using Gateaux derivative, we can approximate the contract price as
V0 ≃ V 0 +CCA0 (D.6)
where
CCA0 = E
Q(j)
[∫ TN
0
e−
∫ s
0
(c
(j)
u +y
(j,i)
u )dumax
(
−V s, 0
)
max
(
−y(j,i)s , 0
)
ds
]
. (D.7)
Although V t is simply a price under symmetric collateralization using currency (i), we
need to be careful about the advance reset conventions. One can show that
V t =
N∑
n=γ(t)+1
EQ
(j)
[
e−
∫ Tn
t
(c
(j)
u +y
(j,i)
u )du
{
−e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(j)
u du − δnB +
f
(j,i)
x (Tn)
f
(j,i)
x (Tn−1)
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(i)
u du
}∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+EQ
(j)

e− ∫ Tγ(t)t (c(j)u +y(j,i)u )du

−e
(∫ t
Tγ(t)−1
+
∫ Tγ(t)
t
)
c
(j)
u du
− δγ(t)B +
e
∫ t
Tγ(t)−1
c
(i)
u du
f
(j,i)
x (Tγ(t)−1)
e
∫ Tγ(t)
t c
(i)
u duf (j,i)x (Tγ(t))


∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

 ,
(D.8)
where γ(t) = min{n;Tn > t, n = 1 · · ·N}. Note that Tγ(t)−1 < t since we are considering
spot-start swap (or T0 = 0). Assuming the independence of y
(j,i) and other variables, we
can simplify Vt(0) and obtains
V t = −
N∑
n=γ(t)
D(j)(t, Tn)Y
(j,i)(t, Tn)δnB +
N∑
n=γ(t)+1
D(j)(t, Tn−1)
(
Y (j,i)(t, Tn−1)− Y
(j,i)(t, Tn)
)
−Y (j,i)(t, Tγ(t))e
∫ t
Tγ(t)−1
c
(j)
s ds
+
f
(j,i)
x (t)
f
(j,i)
x (Tγ(t)−1)
e
∫ t
Tγ(t)−1
c
(i)
s ds
, (D.9)
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where we have defined Y (j,i)(t, T ) = EQ
(j)
[
e−
∫ T
t
y
(j,i)
s ds
∣∣∣Ft]. We need to evaluate the
above V at each time step of Monte Carlo simulation to calculate CCA of Eq. (D.7).
D.2 Asymmetrically collateralized OIS
For spot-start, TN -maturing OIS, we have
V0 = E
Q(j)
[∫
]0,TN ]
e−
∫ s
0
R(u,Vu)dudDs
]
, (D.10)
where
dDs =
N∑
n=1
δTn(s)
[
δnS −
(
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(j)
u du − 1
)]
, (D.11)
and
R(t, Vt) = c
(j)
t +max(y
(j,i)
t , 0)1{Vt<0} . (D.12)
Using Gateaux derivative, the above swap value can be approximated as
V0 ≃ V 0 +CCA0, (D.13)
where
CCA0 = E
Q(j)
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
0
c
(j)
u dumax
(
−V s, 0
)
max
(
y(j,i)s , 0
)
ds
]
, (D.14)
and
V t = E
Q(j)

 N∑
n=γ(t)
e−
∫ Tn
t
c
(j)
u du
{
δnS −
(
e
∫ Tn
Tn−1
c
(j)
u du
− 1
)}∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft


=
N∑
n=γ(t)
D(j)(t, Tn)δnS − e
∫ t
Tγ(t)−1
c
(j)
u du
+D(j)(t, TN ) . (D.15)
Here, S is the fixed OIS rate.
E Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the case of y1 ≥ y2. From Eq. (2.6), one can show that the pre-default value V
can also be written in the following recursive form:
Vt = E
Q
[
−
∫
]t,T ]
(
rs − µ(s, Vs)
)
Vsds+
∫
]t,T ]
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (E.1)
Let us define the following variables:
V˜t = e
−
∫ t
0
(rs−y1s)dsVt (E.2)
D˜t =
∫
]0,t]
e−
∫ s
0
(ru−y1u)dudDs . (E.3)
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Note that
rt − µ(t, Vt) = (rt − y
1
t ) + (y
1
t − y
2
t )1{Vt≥0}
= (rt − y
1
t ) + η
1,2
t 1{Vt≥0} , (E.4)
where we have defined ηi,j = yi − yj . Using new variables, Eq. (E.1) can be rewritten as
V˜t = E
Q
[
−
∫
]t,T ]
η1,2s 1{V˜s≥0}V˜sds +
∫
]t,T ]
dD˜s
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (E.5)
And hence we have,
V˜ abt − V˜
a
t − V˜
b
t = E
Q
[
−
∫
]t,T ]
η1,2s
(
max
(
V˜ abs , 0
)
−max
(
V˜ as , 0
)
−max
(
V˜ bs , 0
))
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
(E.6)
Let us denote the upper bound of η1,2 as α, and also define Y = V˜ ab − V˜ a − V˜ b and
Gs = −η
1,2
s
(
max
(
V˜ abs , 0
)
−max
(
V˜ as , 0
)
−max
(
V˜ bs , 0
))
. Then, we have YT = 0 and
Y = EQ
[∫
]t,T ]
Gsds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (E.7)
Gs = −η
1,2
s
(
max
(
V˜ abs , 0
)
−max
(
V˜ as , 0
)
−max
(
V˜ bs , 0
))
≥ −η1,2s
(
max(V˜ abs , 0) −max(V˜
a
s + V˜
b
s , 0)
)
≥ −η1,2s max
(
V˜ abs − V˜
a
s − V˜
b
s , 0
)
≥ −α|Ys| . (E.8)
Applying the consequence of the Stochastic Gronwall-Bellman Inequality in Lemma B2 of
Ref. [5] to Y and G, we can conclude Yt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], and hence V
ab ≥ V a+ V b.
F Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the case of y1 ≥ y2. Let us define
V˜ Ft = e
−
∫ t
0
(rs−y1s)dsV Ft (F.1)
V˜ Gt = e
−
∫ t
0
(rs−y1s)dsV Gt , (F.2)
as well as
D˜t =
∫
]0,t]
e−
∫ s
0
(ru−y1u)dudDs (F.3)
as in the previous section. Then, we have
V˜ Gt = E
Q
[
−
∫
]t,T ]
η1,2s max(V˜
G
s , 0)ds +
∫
]t,T ]
dD˜s
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
(F.4)
V˜ Ft = E
Q
[
−
∫
]t,T ]
η1,2s max(V˜
F
s , 0)ds +
∫
]t,T ]
dD˜s
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (F.5)
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Now, let us define
Ut = E
Q
[
V˜ Gt
∣∣∣Ft] . (F.6)
Then, using Jensen’s inequality, we have
Ut ≤ E
Q
[
−
∫
]t,T ]
η1,2s max(Us, 0)ds +
∫
]t,T ]
dD˜s
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (F.7)
Therefore, we obtain
V˜ Ft − Ut ≥ E
Q
[
−
∫
]t,T ]
η1,2s
(
max(V˜ Fs , 0)−max(Us, 0)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(F.8)
≥ EQ
[
−
∫
]t,T ]
η1,2s
∣∣V˜ Fs − Us∣∣ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (F.9)
Using the stochastic Gronwall-Bellman Inequality as before, one can conclude that V˜ Ft ≥
Ut for all t ∈ [0, T ], and in particular, V
F
0 ≥ V
G
0 .
G Comparison of Gateaux Derivative with PDE
In order to get clear image for the reliability of Gateaux derivative, we compare it with the
numerical result directly obtained from PDE. We consider a simplified setup where MtM-
CCOIS exchanges the coupons continuously, and the only stochastic variable is a spread
y. Consider continuous payment (i, j)-MtMCCOIS where the leg of currency (i) needs
notional refreshments. We assume following situation as the asymmetric collateralization:
(1) Party 1 is the basis spread payer and can use either the currency (i) or (j) as collateral.
(2) Party 2 is the basis spread receiver and can only use the currency (i) as collateral.
In this case, one can see that the value of t-start T -maturing contract from the view
point of party 1 is given by (See, Eq. (5.17).)
Vt = E
Q(j)
[∫ T
t
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
R(u, Vu)du
)(
y(j,i)s −B
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (G.1)
where
R(t, Vt) = c
(j)(t) + y
(j,i)
t +max
(
−y
(j,i)
t , 0
)
1{Vt<0} (G.2)
and B is a fixed spread for the contract. y(j,i) is the only stochastic variable and its
dynamics is assumed to be given by the following Hull-White model:
dy
(j,i)
t =
(
θ(j,i)(t)− κ(j,i)y
(j,i)
t
)
dt+ σ(j,i)y dW
Q(j)
t . (G.3)
Here, θ(j,i)(t) is a deterministic function specified by the initial term structure of y(j,i),
κ(j,i) and σ
(j,i)
y are constants. WQ
(j)
is a Brownian motion under the spot martingale
measure of currency (j).
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The PDE for Vt is given by
∂
∂t
V (t, y) +
(
γ(t, y)
∂V (t, y)
∂y
+
(
σ
(j,i)
y
)2
2
∂2
∂y2
V (t, y)
)
−R
(
t, V (t, y)
)
V (t, y) + y −B = 0 ,
(G.4)
where
γ(t, y) = θ(j,i)(t)− κ(j,i)y . (G.5)
If party 1 is a spread receiver, we need to change y −B to B − y, of course.
Terminal boundary condition is trivially given by V (T, ·) = 0. On the lower boundary
of y or when y = −M (= ymin)≪ 0, we have Vt < 0 for all t. Thus, we have R(s, V (s, y)) =
c(j)(s) for all s ≥ t, if y = −M at time t. Therefore, on the lower boundary, the value of
MtMCCOIS is given by
V (t,−M) = EQ
(j)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
c
(j)
u du(y(j,i)s −B)ds
∣∣∣∣ y(j,i)t = −M
]
=
∫ T
t
D(j)(t, s)
(
−B −
∂
∂s
lnY (j,i)(t, s)
)
ds . (G.6)
Since c(j)(t) is a deterministic function, D(j)(t, s) = D(j)(0, s)/D(j)(0, t) is simply given
by the forward.
On the other hand, when y = M (= ymax) ≫ 0, we have Vt > 0 for all t. Thus we
have R(s, V (s, y)) = c(j)(s)+ y(j,i)(s) for all s ≥ t, if y =M at time t. Thus, on the upper
boundary, the value of the contract becomes
V (t,M) = EQ
(j)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(
c
(j)
u +y
(j,i)
u
)
du
(
y(j,i)s −B
)∣∣∣∣ y(j,i)t =M
]
=
∫ T
t
{
−BD(j)(t, s)Y (j,i)(t, s)−D(j)(t, s)
∂
∂s
Y (j,i)(t, s)
}
ds . (G.7)
Now let us compare the numerical result between Gateaux derivative and PDE. In the
case of Gateaux derivative, the contract value is approximated as
Vt ≃ V t +∇Vt, (G.8)
where
V t = E
Q(j)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(c
(j)
u +y
(j,i)
u )du
(
y(j,i)s −B
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (G.9)
and
∇Vt = E
Q(j)
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(c
(j)
u +y
(j,i)
u )du
[
−V s
]+
max
(
−y(j,i)s , 0
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (G.10)
V t is the value of the contract under symmetric collateralization where both parties post
currency (i) as collateral, and ∇Vt is a deviation from it.
In Fig. 6, we plot the price difference of continuous 10y-MtMCCOIS from its symmetric
limit obtained by PDE and Gateaux derivative with various volatility of y(j,i). Term
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Figure 6: Price difference from symmetric limit for 10y continuous MtMCCOIS
structures of y(j,i) and other curves are given in Appendix H. Here, the spread B is chosen
in such a way that the swap price is zero in the case where both parties can only use
currency (i) as collateral, or B is a market par spread. The price difference is Vt − V t
and expressed as basis points of notional. From our analysis using the recent historical
data in Ref. [11], we know that the annualized volatility of y is around 50 bps for a calm
market but it can be more than (100 ∼ 200) bps when CCS market is volatile (We have
used EUR/USD and USD/JPY pairs.). One observes that Gateaux derivative provides
reasonable approximation for wide range of volatility. If the party 1 is a spread receiver,
both of the methods give very small price differences, less than 1bp of notional.
H Data used in Numerical Studies
The parameter we have used in simulation are
κ(j) = κ(i) = 1.5% (H.1)
σ(j)c = σ
(i)
c = 1% (H.2)
σ(j,i)x = 12% . (H.3)
All of them are defined in annualized term. The volatility of y(j,i) is specified in the main
text in each numerical analysis.
Term structures and correlation used in simulation are given in Fig. 7. There we have
defined
R
(k)
OIS(T ) = −
1
T
lnEQ
(k)
[
e−
∫ T
0 c
(k)
s ds
]
Ry(j,i)(T ) = −
1
T
lnEQ
(j)
[
e−
∫ T
0
y
(j,i)
s ds
]
.
32
The curve data is based on the calibration result of typical JPY and USD market data
of early 2010. In Monte Carlo simulation, in order to reduce simulation error, we have
adjusted drift terms θ(t) to achieve exact match to the relevant forwards in each time step.
Figure 7: Term structures and correlation used for simulation
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